What are "values?"
They're not what they seem...
They are constantly evoked: everybody talks about “values,” but most assume that they know without asking
What if we ask: what are “values?”
Most of the time they are in the background; it’s only occasionally that we hear about what they are
For example, I was asked about the “trolley problem” (invented by Phillipa Foot in a paper: “The Problem of Abortion & the Doctrine of the Double Effect”)
I stated that I’d not choose between the one & the five; in other words, I’d not throw the switch…
The “trolley problem” was really to decide between the “utilitarian” approach—to throw the switch & kill one instead of 5—or the “deontological” appproach—to not throw the switch in order to save the most lives….
The “trolley problem” was an assumption of meaning to the “problem of throwing the switch”…
The “trolley problem” assumed the value of a human life; it didn’t ask the question: what if human lives have no more or less meaning than any other?
If human lives have no more meaning than any other lives, then they may be sacrificed at will…
So, I refuse to “throw the switch,” preferring instead to assume the “switch thrower” also has the power to stop the trolley altogether
I choose this option & so avoid the question of “human life” also altogether
The problem of “human meaning” is assumed without being proven: the problem of human meaning may be subsumed under the problem of “meaning” as such
So the question of “values” kicks in: why is human meaning so much different from meaning in general? And how does meaning in general arise anyway?
The “problem of values” goes away when the “problem of meaning” is considered in this way…
So the “problem of values” is really the “problem of meaning” in disguise: the problem is human beings introducing meaning when it is unnecessary
So when is “meaning” appropriate? Whenever the question of “meaning” is explicitly addressed, rather than being masked by, for example, the “trolley problem”…